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If an instrument, e.g., an ax, were a natural body, 
then its substance would be being ax,l and this would 
be its soul; if this were removed, it would no longer be 
an ax, except homonymously. But as it is, it is an ax. 
Aristotle, De Anima 412b11-15 
Commenting upon this passage froin Aristotle's De Anima 11.1, Aquinas duly 
notes that Aristotle says that, if we were to suppose that an ax has a soul 
which makes it what it is, and then supposed that soul to be removed, the 
ax would no longer be an ax. Then he continues his account: 
Now, howmer; because the ax is not a natural body arid its form is not 
'the what it is for it to be what it was' of such a body, if the form of the 
ax is removed, it still is an ax.2 
This is an odd remark. One would have supposed, quite to the contrary, that 
upon removal of its form, the thing would ips0 facto cease to be an ax. 
1. For 'pelukei einai'I adopt the 'being ax' of M. Furth, Aristotk: Metaphysics: 
Books Zeta, Eta, Theta, Iota (WI-X), (Indianapqlis: Hackett, 1985), p. 105, but without 
his subscript 'd' to indicate the presence of the characteristic dative construction; I 
use the same expression for the Latin equivalent in Aquinas' commentary, 'dolabre 
esse' Otherwise, I fol10.w in prihciple the translation of D. W. Hamlyn, AristotZeS De 
Anima (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968). I accept his "the what it is for it 
to be what it was" as a formuld renderinc of Aristotle's formula "to ti in  einai". and 
I use thk same translation for the Latin yendering found in Aquinas' commentary, 
"quod quid erat esse." 
2. Thomas Aquinas, Sententia lilrri de Anima, Opera Omnia, t. XLV (Paris: Com- 
missio Lenonina/Vrin, 1984). Cited as DA Lib. 11, cap. 2, p. 75. Italicizing indicates 
the Leonine editors' decision about what part of commentary text is the lemma of 
Aristotle on which Aquinas is commenting. There are some problems with their 
decisions deriving partially fiom uncertai,nty about what text of De Anima Aquinas 
was using. For a very lengthy discussion of the text of Aristotle,used by Aquinas, cf. 
the introduction to this Leonine edition, part 111, "Le texte utilisC par St. Thomas," 
pp. 172*-199". 
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Aquinas quickly offers a gloss: by "it is an ax," Aristotle means that "the
substance of the ax" will remain in the sense that the same underlying
substance will remain, "though the artificial body itself does not remain in
actuality."3
This is a fairly odd thing for Aristotle to mean by saying what he does.
And Aquinas's commentary raises some further questions. For one thing,
Aquinas's gloss on Aristotle's "it is an ax" would seem to commit Aristotle
to the irregular view that the ax is an ax just by virtue of being made of iron,
which, on the face of it, presupposes a peculiar theory about artifacts. And
how does the story go, acording to Aquinas, when the form of the (never
ensouled) ax is removed? Should we imagine that when the form of the ax
is removed, we are left with a pile of scrap iron? Or should we imagine, not
a residual heap of iron filings, but this very piece of iron rendered ineffec-
tive—blunted perhaps, or somehow mysteriously deprived of its ax-making
"oomph"? Aquinas's account is curiously uninformative about this. And
what is the scope of "in actuality" in the interpretation Aquinas offers? Does
Aquinas mean to say that the ax is no longer an ax in actuality (is the point
that it is just potentially an ax?), or that the "bodily" residue of the ax is no
longer an actually functioning "body" of an ax, once the form is removed?
I shall argue that the meaning of Aristotle's text is relatively straightfor-
ward and unproblematic. I will then offer some suggestions about how so
acute a commentator as Aquinas came to produce such an odd reading of
this passage. It turns out that Aquinas's problems are not unique. This
passage is a veritable tar pit; Albert the Great, Themistius, and Averroes also
produced obscure treatments of it. This sort of uniformity among commen-
tators suggests that there are philosophical difficulties which lie behind the
text. Most obviously in this case, since De Anima II. 1 begins Aristotle's
presentation of his own account of the soul, commentators and translators
are heavily influenced at this juncture by the need to make Aristotle's text
say what they want his theory of the soul to have been.
I want to concentrate initially on a prior problem, however; for the
Aristotelian tradition, the ontology of artifacts is problematic, and so it is
not clear how Aristotle's counterfactual involving the ensouled ax is sup-
posed to work, or what it is supposed to show. For Aristotle, I think, the issue
of artifacts was not a very difficult one or one of critical importance. But,
from the theological-philosophical perspective of the Middle Ages, the
distinction between nature and art is extremely important: nature is the
work of God, and is, as such, an appropriate object of scientific knowledge,
whereas art, being a matter of the arbitrary imposition of arrangements and
qualifications upon natural entities, is the product of man's will and willful-
ness—art and artifacts are therefore not in principle scientifically knowable.
The issue of the ontological status of artifacts is thus of special impor-
tance to medieval philosophers of language who hold that language is, to a
3. DA Lib. II, cap. 2, p. 75.
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significant degree, a matter of human artifice, for to the extent that it is a
matter of artifice, it is placed outside of the range of scientific knowledge.
As De Anima II. 1 becomes a locus dassicus for theorizing about natural
objects, artifacts, and their respective levels of actuality and perfection, the
philosophical and terminological problems we see in the De Anima com-
mentaries tend to reappear in those theories of language which understand
language on the artifact model.
I. DE ANIMA II. 1
Aristotle's De Anima text is fairly straightforward:
(la) On the one hand it has been stated, universally speaking, what
the soul is; for it is substance, that corresponding to the principleL,
of a thing.
(lb) This on the other hand is "what it is for it to be what it was" for
a body of such a kind.
(2) Compare the following: If some instrument (organon), e.g., an
ax, were a natural body then
(2a) on the one hand its substance would be "being ax", and this
would be its soul;
(2b) on the other hand if this were removed it would no longer be an
ax, except homonymously.
(3) But as it is, it is an ax;
(4) for it is not of this kind of body that the soul is "what it is for it
to be what it was" and the principle, but of a certain kind of natural
body having within itself a source of movement and rest.4
Aristotle here first offers a reprise of his results to this point: the soul falls
by definition under substance in the sense of form [la], which makes it the
to ti en einai (the "what it is for it to be what it was") of a body of a particular
kind [ lb] . The kind of body in question he has specified in the text
immediately preceeding as "a natural (physikou) body having life potentially
(dynamei)" (412a20-21, 28) which, he says, is the same as being "a natural
organic (physikou organikou) body." (412b6-7)
In (2) he offers a sort of thought experiment for purposes of illustra-
tion. Suppose, he says, that some tool like an ax were not an artificial body,
4. Aristotle, De Anima, 412b10. In Hamlyn's translation, the subscript 'L' indi-
cates that the English word following is a translation of some form or morphological
relative of the Greek logos. I diverge from Hamyln's translation in making explicit
the men . . . de structure of the text by means of the awful "on the one hand . . . on the
other hand" construction. Like the "quidem . . . autem" construction adopted by
William of Moerbeke, it has frequently no lexical meaning in itself, but serves rather
to reveal the intended logical structure of Aristotle's text.
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but a natural one. Then (2a) "being ax" would be its substance, and this
"being ax" would be its soul. Correspondingly (2b), if its substance in this
sense should be removed, then it would no longer be an ax, having lost what
made it what it was, that is, an ax. It might still be called an ax homony-
mously, he concedes; later in the passage he makes the similar point that a
sightless eye is said to be an eye only homonymously, like an eye of stone or
a picture of an eye.5 (3) But as things are, he continues, it is just an ax, for
(4) the ax is not the kind of body which has a "what it is for it to be what it
was" which is a soul; this is because only natural bodies having within
themselves the source of motion and rest can have souls.6
I want to make several points about Aristotle's text as I read it. First, (3)
marks Aristotle's return from his counterfactual hypothesis to the real
world of soulless axes, and does not state a contrast with (2b). Secondly, I
take (4) as a brief elucidation of (3), which seems to be the natural way to
read its postpositive 'for' (gar).
Finally,, Aristotle's ax analogy is situated within a longer passage which
has to do with the relationship between soul and body; the passage as a
whole is concerned to explain the sense in which the soul is activity, but it
is also concerned with the correlative question of how to determine the
precise meaning of "a body having life potentially," which, Aristotle has said,
is the same as being "an organic body." Early in this chapter, "organon" has
been used to designate natural bodily organs:
Hence the soul is the first actuality of a natural body which has life
potentially. Whatever is organic will be a body of this kind. Even the
parts of plants are organs, although extremely simple ones, e.g., the
leaf is a covering for the pod, and the pod for the fruit; while roots are
analogous to the mouth, for both take in food. If then we are to speak
of something common to every soul, it will be the first actuality of a
natural, organic body. (DA 412a27-412b6)
In the ax analogy, as we have seen, "organon" is also used in a second sense
to designate a tool or instrument like an ax. Aristotle follows the ax analogy
with a second—and closer—analogy. "If the eye were an animal," he says,
"sight would be its soul." (DA 312b17-18) The eye is not an animal either,
because it is a "part," that is, not fully autotelic; but, being an organ itself in
the biological sense, the eye offers a better analogy to the animal: "as the
part is to the whole, so analogously is perception as a whole to the whole
perceptive body as such." (DA 412b23-25) Aristotle does not, however, drop
his first analogy at this point; instead, he draws out the parallels between
5. DeAnima 412b20-22.
6. To be sure the ax had to be made as it is in order to serve its purpose; but
that purpose exists in the mind of the maker, and the ax has been constructed so
as to embody that purpose by the art of the maker—its "development" is thus not
motivated by some natural internal dynamic of its own.
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both the ax and the eye, on the one hand, and the soul on the other: "Like
cutting or seeing, so the waking state is an actuality, while the soul is like
sight and the potential of the instrument (dynamis organou); the body is that
which is this potentially." (DA 412b27)
It seems a fair question why Aristotle is muddying the waters with an
exploitation7 of the several applications of "organon"in a section devoted to
giving his own account of the soul, having spent Book I on the vagaries,
confusions and stray insights of his predecessors.
Certainly one thing he is doing is offering an artifact as an analogy for
the teleological structure of the living creature. He wants to insist that a
body which "has life potentially" must consist of a set of interlocking struc-
tures arranged according to purpose; and the more overt purposive charac-
ter of the artificial tool suggests itself as an illuminating analogue. The ax
analogy is also introduced for contrast; the latitude of meaning of Organon'
and the succession of examples focus attention on the fact that the ax is the
wrong sort of organon to have a soul; its matter has the wrong relation to its
form for it to have life, for its body does not have "within itself a source of
motion and rest."
In addition, the latitude of application of organon is important to a
larger agenda. De AnimallΛ concludes:
(i) That, on the one hand, therefore, the soul or certain parts of it, if
it is divisible, cannot be separated from the body is quite clear; for
in some cases the actuality is of the parts themselves—not that
anything prevents at any rate some parts from being separable,
because of their being actualities of no body, (ii) On the other hand,
it is still not clear whether the soul is the actuality of the body in the
way that the sailor is of the ship. (DA 413a2-10).
(i) is precisely what we have expected; and tacked on to the end of (i) is an
intimation of a position explicitly held by Aristotle8—that in the way in
which sight has the eye as its organon, reason has no proper organon. (ii) is
surprising; although Aristotle does not here assert the pilot-and-ship anal-
ogy, he does not dismiss it either. Apparently, in this "most general" and
"schematic" account of the soul, Aristotle means to leave open the possibil-
ity that the body is to be understood as related to the rational soul in
somewhat the same way as the ax is related to woodsman or warrior, that is,
as something by means of which reason's designs are realized in the world.
What Aristotle does here is, I think, part of a larger investigation that is
picked up again at De Anima III.9 ff., where he turns his attention from
7. Cf. esp. 432al-2, where the hand is said to be the "organon organon." I am
indebted to Ronna Berger for her insistence that some answer is wanted to the
question about Aristotle's intent in mixing up his terminology at such a critical
point in the presentation of his theory.
8. Cf. DA 429*26.
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perception and cognition to the movements of animals, which involve
"something bodily which is the organon by which desire produces move-
ment." (433b19) In any event, Aristotle's exploitation in DeAnimallΛ of the
related, but distinct, applications of organon fixes a troublesome latitude of
meaning upon the Greek expression which will carry over to its Latin
translations, Όrganum'and 'instrumentum\
II. AQUINAS'S COMMENTARY ON DE ANIMA
Aquinas's commentary reads:
(2)
 A Just as, if some tool (aliquod organum), that is some artificial tool
(artificialium instrumentum), for example an ax, were a physical body
(corpus physicum), that is a natural one, its form would be related to
it in the aforesaid way. And therefore he continues,
(2a)A For indeed, ''being ax" would be its substance, that is the form of
the ax from which the rational principle (ratio) is received; this
rational principle he calls "being ax" because on the basis of it an
ax is said to be an ax . . . and further, if the ax were not only a
physical body, but also an animated body, the form of the ax would
be a soul.
(2b)A and if it were removed, there would no longer be an ax, except
equivocally, just as, if the soul is removed, there is neither flesh nor
eye except equivocally.
(3)A Now, however, because the ax is not a natural body and its form
is not the "what it is to be what it was" of such a body, if the form
of the ax is removed, it still is an ax, i.e., the substance of an ax. For
the substance of artificial bodies is their matter, which remains
when the form is removed, although the artificial body itself does
not remain in actuality.9
9. DA Lib. II, c. 2: "Sic igitur anima dicitur forma substancialis quia est de
essencia sive de quiditate corporis animati . . . Et quia forme substanciales cuius-
modi sunt forme corporum naturalium, sunt latentes, manifestat hoc per formas
artifϊciales, que sunt accidentales, et hoc est quod subdit: sicut si aliquod organorum,
id est artificialium instrumentorum, ut puta dolabra, esset corpus phisicum, id est
naturale, forma sua hoc modo se haberet sicut dictum est. Et ideo subdit: erat quidem
enim dolabre esse substancia ipsius, id est : forma dolabre secundum quam accipitur
ratio dolabre, quam quidem rationem nominat esse dolabre eo quod secundum
earn dolabra dicitur esse dolabra . . . et ulterius, si dolabra non solum esset corpus
phisicum set etiam corpus animatum, forma dolabre esset anima et, ea separata, non
esset amplius dolabra nisi equivoce, sicut, separata anima, non est caro aut oculus nisi
equivoce; nunc autem quia dolabra non est corpus naturale, nee eius forma est quod
quid erat esse tali corpori, remota forma dolabre adhuc est dolabra, id est substancia
dolabre; substancia enim corporum artificialium est materia ipsorum, que remanet
sublata forma artifkiali, licet non remaneat ipsum corpus artificiale in actu" (p. 75).
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Like Aristotle, Aquinas shows little interest in describing the hypotheti-
cally living ax or what is left of it after its "death," except to say, as Aristotle
does in (2b), that it would no longer be an ax. But Aristotle's (3), "As it is,
it is an ax," is read by Aquinas as describing a contrast to this outcome: in
contrast to the ensouled ax, which would cease to be an ax if its form were
withdrawn (2b), the soulless ax "is still an ax after its form is withdrawn."
He reads (3) as:
(3)A Now, however . . . it still is an ax.
Aquinas has thus apparently read "however" in Aristotle's (3) as indicating
contrast, and has gone searching for whatever it is that (3) contrasts with;
he finds it in (2b) that is, in the claim that the besouled ax, having lost its
form, is an ax no longer. (3) must say, he reasons, that if the soulless ax loses
its form, it stays an ax. As we have noted, he quickly glosses this peculiar
reading of (3) a£ saying that the ax continues to be an ax only in the sense
that its natural matter—the real substance of the artifact—remains. The
artificial body is no longer actually there, he adds.
Aquinas's reading is ingenious. There are some Aristotelian opposi-
tional pairs in this passage, and the "however" of (3) and (3)A is the sort of
expression which could mark such an opposition. In addition, the gloss
Aquinas offers for the strange claim that a soulless ax will still be an ax after
losing its ax-form has the virtue of being something which Aristotle might
have said, had he been talking about what Aquinas has him talking about:
when an iron ax ceases to have an ax-form, the natural substance it is made
of—its iron—is what is still there. Moreover, the point is germane; in this
chapter Aristotle does take an interest in what counts as an appropriate
body for a living thing and later states that what has lost its soul does not
count as potentially being a living thing.10 Body as such, then, is not a
substance like iron, which has a natural integrity that can be left behind
when the form is removed, then reassumed. Finally, Aquinas has anticipated
the obvious objection to his reading that (4) cannot be taken as an argu-
ment for (3) understood as Aquinas understands it; he proposes to take (4)
as a general rationale for the whole contrast between animal and artifact
which is set up in the passage:
(4)A And because he has said that matters are one way now with
respect to the ax, and would be otherwise if it were an animate
natural body, he gives a reason for this, saying that this is because
the soul is not the "what it is for it to be what it was" and rational
character, that is the form, of a body of this sort, that is an artificial
one, but of a natural body of this sort, that is having life; and in order
10. DA412b25-26.
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to make clear what it is to be a natural body, he adds: having in itself
apήnciple of motion and rest.11
This reading is ingenious, but wrong. The gloss Aquinas offers for (3),
understood as (3)A, is implausible; even if (3)A, is authentically Aristotelian
in spirit, it is unlikely that Aristotle would have expressed this sentiment by
saying "It is (still) an ax," and not "It is (still) iron." We would need a good
reason for adopting a reading which forced us to accept Aquinas's gloss. An
Aristotelian oppositional construction linking the claim about the "death"
of the hypothetically besouled ax (2b) and a correlative claim about what
happens when the merely artificial ax loses its form would constitute such
a reason; but a look at the Greek passage shows that the "But" (de) of the
introductory phrase of (3) is not the second part of such an oppositional
pair, all of which are closed off by this point.1 2 Aquinas's reading requires
that we ride fairly roughshod over the oppositional structure of the passage
(which is very clearly marked in Moerbeke's translations from the Greek by
the use of 'quidem . . . autem'for 'men . . . de\)ls Moreover, whatever his
general practice, in De Anima Aristotle typically uses the locution 'But as it
is' (nun de) just to mark the return to actual fact from one of his exasperat-
ing contrary-to-fact hypotheses.14
Why did Aquinas offer this interpretation? There is some similarity
between Aquinas's reading and Albert the Great's treatment of the passage:
And if, holding to our earlier supposition, i.e., that the ax is a natural
body, the body of the ax which is iron should be separated from the
11. DA II, c. 2, 11.70-79: Έt quia dixerat quod aliter nunc est in dolabra et
aliter esset si esset corpus phisicum animatum, assignat rationem huius, dicens
quod hoc ideo est quia anima non est quod quid est esse et ratio, id est forma,
huiuscemodi corpoήs, scilicet artificialis, set corporis phisici huiuscemodi, scilicet haben-
tis vitam; et ut manifestat quid sit esse phisicum corpus, subiungit habentis in se ipso
pήncipium motus et status: naturalia enim sunt que in se ipsis principium motus et
status habent; huiusmodi enim principium natura dicitur" (p. 75).
12. There are two such oppositional pairs. The first, in [la] and [lb], is of con-
siderable interest in a way which is not entirely germane to our discussion. Aristotle
seems clearly to be signalling a change of direction in the discussion. He first sums up
what can be said of the soul as a universal—that it is substance and entelechy; then he
turns to what can be said of the individual soul, that is, that it is the 'what it was for it to
be' of a particular body of a special kind. There is, then, some support here for the
position taken by Alan Code in "The Aporematic Approach to Primary Being in Meta-
physics Z,n The Canadian Journal ofPhilosophy, Supplementary Vol. X, (1984) pp. 1-20,
that Aristotle attemps "to assign distinct and independent causal roles to the particu-
lar soul and the species-form," and perhaps for the further claim that "only the latter
can function as a principle of life" (pp. 19-20).
13. This is one of the respects in which Moerbeke is systematically faithful to
his Greek originals. Cf. the table of equivalents on p. LXVofVerbeke's introduction
to Themistius: Commentaire sur de traite de lame d'Aήstote: Traduction de Guillaume de
Moerbeke (PDA). (Louvain/Paris: Publications Universitaires de Louvain and Edi-
tions Beatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1957).
14. Cf. DA 423*10; 423a20; 429a25.
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form of the ax, then it will have neither the being nor the ratio of iron;
but that the iron is still (adhuc) customarily said to be iron (ferrum adhuc
estferrum . . . apud usum loquendi) when the form of the ax is separated
from it is due to the fact that the ax is an artificial, and not a natural
instrument.15
While Albert's commentary settles on the importance of the persistence of
the iron, he focuses completely on the matter of the supposed ax-animal.
That matter would not remain iron, he says, if the ax-soul were removed. We
still property call the matter iron, he continues, if the form is removed—and
this has to be because the ax isjust an artifact. Albert seems to have forgotten,
as Aquinas has not, that Aristotle's (3) says that the ax remains an ax.
There are two further circumstances which may bear on Aquinas's
understanding of Aristotle's text and which bear looking into. First, it is
frequently difficult to say precisely what version of the base text a medieval
commentator is using. So, what precisely, did Aquinas' text of Aristotle say?
As we have seen, Aquinas reads (3) as
(3)* Now, however, it is still an ax.
The "still" in (3)* tilts the meaning of (3) considerably, albeit perhaps not
decisively, toward Aquinas's reading. The expression occurs in Albert's com-
mentary; but, as we have noted, Albert was talking about the iron. The "still"
(αdhuc) was not in William of Moerbeke's translation of De Animα,16 and it is
not in the earlier translation by James of Venice,17 which Aquinas had himself
used until 1267, when he began his commentary on De Animα.18 However, it
has been well established that Aquinas was working with a very idiosyncratic
15. Albertus Magnus, Libri de Animα, Opera OmniaYll, pars I, (Aschendorff:
Monasterii Westfalorum, 1968), Lib. 2, tract. 1, cap. 4: Έtsi, positione priori retenta,
quod scilicet dolabra sit corpus physicum, corpus dolabrae, quod estferrum, seperatur
a forma dolabrae, iam non habebit nee essenecnomen dolabrae nisi forte aequivoce, sed
quod ferrum adhuc est ferrum, separata ab ipso forma dolabrae, apud usum lo-
quendi, ideo est, quia dolabra est organum artis et non physicum" (pp. 68-69). The
italicized text represents the editors' conjecture as to what part of the text is lemma
taken from either the vetus or the arabo-latina translation of Aristotle's text.
16. Cf. the Latin text of "T," the approximate text used by Aquinas as con-
structed by the Leonine editors of the DeAnima commentary (DA, p. 74), and also
the text of Moerbeke's translation furnished by Verbeke in his edition of Moer-
beke's translation of Themistius' paraphrase (Commentaire).
17. I thankjos Decorte for this information from the forthcoming Aήstoteles Lat-
inus edition of the vetus translation. I have consulted the text of the vetus translation of
DeAnima from the text printed in Albertus Magnus's commentary; it reproduces in
essentials the text published with Petrus Hispanus's commentary on DeAnima, Obras
Filosoficas: II Comentaήo al 'De Anima" de Aήstoteles (Madrid: Consejo Superior Investi-
gationes cientificas, Instituto fllosofico Luis Vives 1944), no. 3, L. II, lect. 2, pp.
537-38. Neither text is a critical edition, and neither has extensive apparatus.
18. Cf. the discussion in the introduction to the Leonine edition of Aquinas's
De Anima commentary, esp. pp, 172*-183*.
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and defective edition of Moerbeke's translation;19 there also seems to have
been fairly wide variation among vetus versions as well.20 Was the suggestive
"still" in his version of the translated Aristotle text? The fact that Aquinas here
appears to give a quotation followed by "that is"—the standard formula for
introducing a literal paraphrase of a quoted lemma—suggests slightly that
his text did contain the word "still." It is difficult to say, for Aquinas frequently
does mix elucidation and quotation, rephrasing slightly the text he is com-
menting on. But the precise answer to the question may not matter; even if
the telltale "still" was not in Aquinas' text of Aristotle, the way in which he
includes it at this point tends to show that he regards it at least as an unprob-
lematic clarification of the text he is analyzing.
The question of why Aquinas considered the "still" to be unproblematic
leads to a second consideration. Aquinas came to his text through the com-
mentaries and paraphrases of others who were frequently working from yet
other versions of the base text, and who tended to have philosophical axes of
their own to grind in their commentaries. A vigorous Latin commentary
tradition had grown up around the "old" translation of ZteAm?n<2 by James of
Venice, among them the commentary of Albert the Great. Many of these
commentaries were symphatetic to the interpretation of Averroes.21 Aquinas
also had access to the Long Commentary on "De Anima" of Averroes, which
included yet another translation of De Anima, the "arabo-latin."22 Through
Averroes, Aquinas was familiar with a good deal of Greek and Arab commen-
tary on De Anima 23 Also, after 1267, Aquinas had available Themistius' para-
phrase of De Anima in the translation of William of Moerbeke. Thus our
second question: What were the Aristotle texts of Aquinas's "authorities" like,
and what did the "authorities" think Aristotle's text meant?
III. AVERROES'S LONG COMMENTARY ON "ΌΈ ANIMA"
By the time of Aquinas's commentary on De Anima, Averroes's Long Com-
mentary was a basic text in the scholastic tradition. Even if there are con-
19. William of Moerbeke's translation (the "nova') was itself a systematic
correction of the earlier translation of James of Venice (the "vetus'). For some
comparisons of (a) the Vetus text; (b) the Nova; and (c) the text used by Aquinas
and his commentary on it, cf. esp. pp. 174*-184* of the introduction to the Leonine
edition of Aquinas's commentary on De Anima, chap III.3.
20. According to the editors of Aquinas's Commentary on "De Anima, "the vetus
text used by Aquinas was one of the "deteήores, "i.e., a text "a text already altered and
corrupted," Intro., chap. IV. 11, pp. 267* ff., "St. Thomas, utilisateur de la Vetus."
21. Commentary on "DeAnima,"pp. 235*-273*.
22. The editors of the De Anima Commentary of Albert the Great, argue that
Albert himself freely quoted from this "arabo-latin" translation, as well as from the
vetus version, which seems to have been his main source (pp. v-vii).
23. Cf. intro. to Aquinas's Commentary on "De Anima, "p. 273*.
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siderable differences between Aquinas' understanding of De Anima II
and that Averroes, there is also a considerable and complex similarity in
matters of textual division and line-by-line exegesis.24 A look at Averroes'
treatment of De Amina 412b10-17 in his Long Commentary on De Amina
shows why Aquinas might have considered the "still" of (3)* unproblem-
atic.25
(2)AV And he says, Just as if some tool, etc. That is: Both the forms and
the essences of natural bodies are substances, for just as if some tool
like an ax were a natural body (that is if we imagine that it is a
natural thing), then
(2a)AV the keenness of the ax would be its substance.
(2b)AV Then he gives the reason for this. And he says: And similarly,
this, when it has been removed, etc. That is: and it is necessary with
respect to the ax that if it were a natural body, its keenness would
be its substance. For we do not call something an ax unless it is
composed of matter, that is iron, and form, which is keenness. And
if the keenness should be removed, and the ax were a natural body,
then there would be no ax because there would not be matter and
form, unless 'ax' were said equivocally. And that through whose
removal this substance is removed is substance, for it is a part of it
and a part of substance is substance.
(3)A V Then he says As things are, however, it will be an ax afterwards.
That is: as it is, however, because the ax is an artificial body, al-
though its keenness should be removed from it, nonetheless it
would afterwards be called an ax because of its shape; for its proper
shape is the same in it with and without keenness.
(4)AV Then he says for the soul is not, etc. That is, with the soul it is
the opposite of how it is with keenness; for the name is removed
from the living thing on account of the removal of the soul, and
the ax retains its name, even if the keenness is removed. For the
soul is not in such a body as that in which there is keen-
ness—<not>, that is, in the body of an artificial instrument (artifi-
24. James C. Doig, "Toward Understanding Aquinas' Com. in De Anima: A
Comparative Study of Aquinas and Averroes on the Definition of Soul (De AnimaB,
1-2)," Rivista dafilisofia neoscolastica 66 (1974): pp. 436-74, gives a thorough com-
parison of the differences and similarities between the two passages of commentary
on De Anima II. 1-2, including an assessment of the effects of the differences
between the vetus translation and the text of Aristotle used by Averroes as reflected
in the "arabo-latin" version.
25. The editors of the Leonine edition of Aquinas's Commentary, pp.
221*-223*, argue that it is difficult to assess the influence of Averroes's Long
Commentary on "De Anima" on Aquinas's commentary. They argue for the view that
Aquinas knew a "scholastic" Averroes, that is, knew the commentary—by then in
the Latin West for more than forty years—as a classical text heavily commented on,
which he thought of as a source "d'informations valables et de formulations
heureuses."
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cialis organici)—, but in a natural <body>. This is what he means
when he says in such a bodyβ6
Thus, instead of (3), Averroes's Aristotle text, a notoriously bad one,
read;
(3)** As things are, however, it will be an ax afterwards.
The "afterwards" of (3)**, with which Aquinas must have been familiar,
clearly weights matters decisively in favor of the interpretation of Aristotle's
(3) Averroes adopts. Given Averroes's text, the point must be that after the
removal of the artificial form, the ax remains an ax. And one has got to find
some reason why Aristotle would say this.
It is easy enough to find a reason for (3) thus interpreted some lines
later in Averroes's commentary:
With respect to the artificial form, because its matter is not removed
when it is removed, but remains in name and definition (since when
the shape of the ax is removed, the iron remains the same as before in
name and definition), it is necessary and proper that its name, i.e., 'ax',
remain,since it picks out this tool as an individual of a substantial kind,
although the keenness is removed.27
26. Averroes, Commentarium magnum in Aήstotelis De Anima Libros, ed. F. Stuart
Crawford (Cambridge, Mass.: Medieval Academy of America, 1953). The translation
into Latin from Arabic is probably the work of Michael Scotus, and there is no Arabic
edition extant of the commentary. Hereafter cited as CM. Έt dixit: quemadmodum, si
aliquod instrumentum, etc. Idest, et forme et essentie corporum naturalium sunt sub-
stantie. Quoniam quemadmodum si aliquod instrumentum esset corpus naturale, ut
securis (idest si ymaginati fuerimus ipsum esse ens naturale), tune acumen securis
esset eius substantia. Deinde dedit rationem super hoc. Et dixit: Et similiter ista cum ab-
stracta est, etc. Idest, et necesse est in securi, si esset ens naturale, ut eius acumen esset
substantia. Securis enim non dicitur nisi illud quod congregatum est ex materia, scili-
cet ferro, et forma, que est acumen. Et si acumen auferatur, et esset securis corpus na-
turale, tune securis non esset, quia materia et forma non essent, nisi diceretur securis
equivoce. Et illud per cuius ablationem auferatur hec substantia est substantia; est
enim pars eius; pars autem substantie est substantia. Deinde dixit: Modo autem eήtpost
securis. Idest, modo autem, quia securis est corpus artificiale, licet acumen sit ablatum
ab eo, tamen post dicetur securis per suam figuram; figura enim propria ei eadem est
in eo cum acuitate et sine" (pp. 140-41). "Deinde dixit: anima enim non est, etc. Idest,
et est de anima econtrario acuitati; nomen enim aufertur ab animato per ablationem
anime, et remanet in secure, licet acumen auferatur. Anima enim non est talis corpo-
ris in quo est acuitas, scilicet corporis artificialis organici, sed naturalis. Et hoc inten-
debat cum dixit tales. Et hoc quod dixit principium motus et quietis est dispositio
corporis naturalis" (II.8.25-44, p. 143).
27. CM Lib. II.8.81-88: "Forma autem artificialis, quia, cum aufertur, non
aufertur materia, sed remanet nomine et diffinitione (quoniam cum figura securis
aufertur, remanet ferrum idem sicut ante nomine et diffinitione), necesse est et
recte ut remaneat nomen eius, scilicet secuήs, quod demonstrat hoc instrumentum
secundum quod est individuum substantie, licet acuitas auferatur" (p. 142).
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This passages offers an obvious source for Aquinas's gloss on (3), that,
possibly because of Averroes's influence, he read as (3)*.
But comparison with Averroes's initial account of Aristotle's argument
uncovers an oddity; this passage offers a rationale for (3)* but is, in fact,
not consistent with Averroes's original account of 412bll—15. Although
Averroes consistently identifies the form that is lost as "keenness,"28 in his
initial discussion he says that we rightly continue to call the residue an ax
after its form is removed because its proper shape (figUra propήa) remains the
same, even if it has lost its edge or ability to cut (acumen); in the section
which seems to be the source of Aquinas's gloss on (3) he says that what
is left of the ax is still rightly called an ax because the characteristics
matter—the iron—remains, even if it has lost the characteήstic shape of an ax
(figura secuήs).
One source of the inconcinnity in Averroes's commentary is an exe-
getical problem he faced. In his lengthy discussion of Aristotle's (3), Aver-
roes elaborates:, "the name 'ax', whether natural or artificial, is said of
the combination of what is like form (quasi forma) in it and that which
is like matter (quasi mateήa)"; the name of an individual of a kind is of
necessity imposed on "matter and form together."29 But, apparently real-
izing that this rationale entails the opposite of (3) (which he read as
(3)**), Averroes abruptly takes the opposite tack: "Or shall we say, " he
asks, "that the name applies to it only as matter, for example, on the
basis of its being an iron body?" He then explains that when the natural
body's form is removed, its proper matter is removed also, as "when seeing
is removed from flesh, the flesh does not remain either, except equivocally,
like the "flesh" of the dead."3 0 Thus in the case of the live thing, when
the form is removed, nothing at all remains on the basis of which it can
non-equivocally be called an individual of the kind it was when it was
alive. By contrast, he continues, since the iron of the artificial ax remains
28. The Latin translation uses both 'acumen' and 'acuitas'. All things consid-
ered, 'acumen' is more likely to mean 'edge' and 'acuitas' 'keeness'; but they seem
to be used interchangeably here. It is not clear whether Michael Scotus, the Latin
translator of Averroes's Long Commentary, was reacting to differences he found in
his Arabic version of the commentary or not.
29. CM Lib. II.8.46-53: "Manifestum est enim per se quod hoc nomen secuήs,
sive fuerit naturale sive artificiale, dicitur de illo congregato ex illo quod est quasi
forma in eo, et ex eo quod est quasi materia. Et etiam manifestum est per se quod
secuήs dicitur de aliquo individuorum substantie. Et sic necesse est ut hoc nomen
quod dicitur de eo secundum quod est individuum substantie sit dictum de eo
secundum materiam et formam insimu" (p. 141).
30. CM Lib. II.8.57-81: "Aut dicamus quod hoc nomen non dicitur de eo nisi
secundum materiam tantum, v.g. secundum quod est corpus ferreum? . . . Forme
igitur naturales substantie sunt, quia cum fuerint ablate, aufertur nomen quod
demonstrat ens secundum quod est individuum substantie, et similiter diffinitio
que est secundum illud nomen; quia auferuntur genus et differentia, quorum
unum demonstrat materiam et aliud formam; v.g. quod, cum sensus aufertur a
carne, non remanet caro, nisi equivoce, sicut caro mortui" (pp. 141-42).
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the same after the form is removed, we rightly continue to call it "ax,"
which is the name which applies to is as an individual of a substantial
kind, that is, iron.31
There is a fairly obvious philosophical source of Averroes's difficulty
as well. In the case of artifacts, the identification of formal and final cause
that is typical of natural substances amounts almost to equivocation. To
see why this is so, suppose the ax to change by progressive dulling. At
some fairly indeterminate point—though surely well short of the point at
which a museum visitor gazing into a case would cease to call it an ax—the
ax's shape will change enough so that only in very special circumstances
by being wielded by Arnold Schwarznegger, for example—will it be useful
for chopping. At that point, that ax's "natural" fitness for its purpose is
gone; its form as final cause is gone. But what, after all, is the form of the
ax but its shape? Thus at this point, the shape of the ax is, and is not
gone; it is gone in the sense that the ax no longer has the shape required
to chop; however, it is not gone enough for the ax to be unidentifiable as
an ax on the general basis of its shape. This, I think, is exactly the source
of Averroes's ambivalent intuitions. The keenness is gone, he says in the
first passage; but the shape remains, whether the thing will cut or not.
The ax has lost its form, he says in the second passage, and what can that
be for so simple an object but to lose its characteristic shape?32 The in-
concinnity can be avoided, obviously, by ignoring one intuition and stipu-
lating that an ax-ish thing that is too dull to cut may not properly be said
to have the shape of an ax at all, that is, by adopting a technical definition
of shape: To be shaped like an ax is, strictly speaking, to be able to function
as one. If this definition is accepted, then our museum visitor who iden-
tifies that ax-ish implement that will not cut as an ax on the basis of how
it looks is just wrong—unless the viewer is just speaking homony-
mously—the sort of fellow who goes around talking of sightless eyes and
dead men. The thing is not an ax; it does not even, technically speaking,
have the shape of an ax.
If Aquinas followed Averroes's commentary closely, he almost certainly
must have noticed that he was faced with an extremely curious piece of
work. Is seems significant, given the tension in Averroes's commentary, that
Aquinas's account says nothing about what it is that is removed when the
form of the merely artificial ax is removed. Also, Aquinas does not elaborate
on Aristotle's claim that "being ax" would be the soul of the ax-animal.33 He
simply adopts Averroes's understanding of (3), then skips to the only
31. CM Lib. Π.8.81-88.
32. This, I think is the move to which Ackrill objects in "Aristotle's Definitions
of Psuche," Proceedings of the Aήstotelian Society 73 (1973): 119-33, when he objects
that "The thing's ability to do a certain job is not identical with its shape, structure,
etc."
33. In addition, clearly he decided to skip entirely the odd section of Averroes'
commentary which seems to give a rationale which renders (3)** false.
SOME MEDIEVAL REFLECTIONS ON DE ANIMA II. 1 15
cogent rationale for (3) to be found in Averroes's commentary. He has
borrowed-around the problem in Averroes's account.34
IV. THE FORM AND MATTER OF ARTIFACTS
Averroes begins his expositions of De Anima 412bll—15 by ascribing to
Aristotle a clear motivation for posing the ax example:
Then he gives the example of artificial bodies, and thereby draws a
distinction between natural and artificial bodies. For the essences of
artificial things are accidents; and therefore certain people suppose
that it is also thus with the essences of natural bodies. And he says: Just
as if some tool, etc.^
Throughout his discussion, Averroes is concerned to stress the point that
the animal body is not to be thought of as a substance with its own substan-
tial integrity to which the soul is accidental or supervenient36; to do so is in
effect to understand living beings as artifacts.
Aquinas understands Aristotle's intent in proposing the ax example
differently:
Because, then, the forms of artifacts are accidents which are more
known to us than substantial forms inasmuch as they are nearer to the
senses, therefore he elucidates the definition of the soul, which is a
substantial form, by way of comparison to accidental forms.37
34. A further problem for Aquinas was that he probably found Themistius's
Paraphrase of "De Anima, " on which he frequently relied, unhelpful at this juncture.
Themistius's paraphrase was available to Aquinas in the Latin translation of William
of Moerbeke: "Puta si naturale corpus dolabra esset et species haec haberet, ut
posset incidere non ab arte sed a natura, animal utique esset, et corpus quidem
ipsius ferrum, anima autem talis figura et akme et incidere. Hoc enim esset do-
labrae esse : hebetata autem et mutata figura non adhuc dolabra, sed aequivoce,
sicut neque Socrates homo post incinerationem, sed aequivoce; nunc autem si
salvetur forma, dolabra quidem est, animal autem non est, non enim artificialis
organi species et ratio anima, sed naturalis vitam habentis: hoc autem erat organi-
cum." Themistius, Commentairep. 99. The question is what is meant by Themistius's
curious addition "si salvetur forma." It may in fact bring Themistius quite close to
what Aristotle had in mind in (3), that is, if the ax be supposed to retain its artificial
form (instead of being supposed to be an ax-animal), it is just an ax. But on
Aquinas's reading of Aristotle's argument, the most obvious reading of Themistius
phrase is something like: but if the (ensouled) ax keeps its form, it is still an ax. An
obviously true, but pointless remark.
35. CM p. 140.
36. CM II.2.98-99: "Materia enim nullum habet esse in actu in corporibus
naturalibus secundum quod est materia, et esse non est in actu nisi forme" (p. 143).
37. DA II, ch. 2, 11. 14-19, p. 74.
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But he agrees with Averroes in warning against understanding the soul as
accidental or adventitious with respect to a body which is already a kind of
substance in its own right:
Therefore it cannot be held that soul is the actuality of body and that
body is its matter and subject in the sense that body is constituted by
one form which makes it be a body, and the soul is added over and
above this to make it a living body. Rather, that it is and that it is body
and that it is living body come from the soul.38
And Aquinas's exposition of De Anima II. 1 draws a sharp contrast between
artifacts and natural bodies precisely because he takes the forms of artifacts
to be accidental to pre-existing substances, in contrast to the substantial
forms of natural substances.39
Neither Averroes nor Aquinas is interested here in the ontology of
artifacts per se. Rather, a particular position about the structure of artifacts
becomes philosophically emphasized here because it allows these two com-
mentators to dramatize the undesirable view that the soul is something
accidental or adventitious with respect to body, which has its own inde-
pendent substantial integrity.
Aristotle's text does not have this emphasis. In De Anima II. 1, Aristotle
does not seem to be interested in how artificial forms inhere in natural
substances, but rather in the fact that artifacts have a causal structure very
much like that of natural substances.40 This is the reading of Themistius
38. DA II. 1: "non est ergo sic intelligendum quod anima sit actus corporis et
quod corpus sit eius materia et subiectum, quasi sit constitutum per Unam formam
que faciat eum esse corpus et superveniat ei anima faciens ipsum esse vivum corpus,
sed quia ab anima est quod sit et quod corpus sit et quod sit corpus vivum" (p. 71).
39. t)A II. 1: "Corpora naturalia sunt principia artificialia, quίa corpora natu-
ralia sunt principia artificialium; ars enim operatur ex materia quam natura minis-
trat, forma autem qύe per artem inducitur est forma accidentalis, sicut figura vel
aliquid huiusmodi" (p. 69).
40. In fact, it seems likely that the substance-αm-accident account of the
ontological composition of artifacts is ndt, at least not consistently, the one Aris-
totle favors. There is some textual justification for attributing the view to him;
in Metaphysics Z.I5 where Aristotle asks whether being a cloak can be understood
as an essence or whether it is not a composite like being pale man, he seems
to opt for the latter account. But in Metaphysics Z.I5, Aristotle uses an artificial
form to illustrate the. difference between form as general logos, e.g., "the being
of house," and form in the concrete, e.g., this house; the latter can be "<in the
process of> perishing . . . or <in the process of> coming to be," though the
former cannot (1039b22-25). Moreover, though Aristotle carefully describes the
reductionist approach in Physics II. 1, he there refrains from asserting it. And in
Physics II. 2 he refers to crafts which "produce their matter, some by producing
it without qualification, others by making it suitable for their work," (194a33-35).
At the very least this conception of matter for art complicates the simple view
that art superimposes an accidental form on pre-existing natural substance.
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(who did consider artificial forms to be accidental)41; he reads both the ax
and the eye examples as simple illustrative parallels, rather than investing
the examples with critical programmatic significance. Indeed, his para-
phrase carries Aristotle's style of illustration further. To Aristotle's brief
remark that neither sperm nor corpses "have life potentially" in the appro-
priate sense, he adds an illustration of his own which harks back to the
example of the ax:
For just as unformed iron is potentially a saw because it is able to take
on such a shape, but is not yet a saw—rather, it will be one when it is
formed and has a cutting shape (figuram incisivam)—, so the sperm is
potentially animal, because it can become an organic body, but is not
yet animal, but <will be one> when it becomes able to take nourish-
ment of its own accord.42
The iron and the iron implement reappear in Themistius' paraphrase
of the final section of Aristotle's chapter:
Again, just as the saw was iron and this form together, and the eye in
turn pupil and vision, so the animal is soul and body together. It is quite
clear, therefore, that the soul is not separable from body; this is either
total, if indeed it is the whole form (species) of such a thing as the shape
is <the whole form> of the iron, or partial, if it [scil. the soul] is
capable of being divided. For of certain parts of the body the parts of
the soul are obviously entelechy and perfection, as sight is for the eye.
Nevertheless nothing prevents some parts of the soul from being sepa-
rated from body, or from not being entelechies in the way that shape
and form are, either for the whole body, or for certain parts. The
intellect seems to be of this kind. It is not yet clear, if it should be the
entelechy of some body, whether it is such as to be inseparable, or
separable, like the pilot from the ship; for he is a sort of entelechy, but
is separable.43
Thus Themistius read Aristotle's chapter without any pointed emphasis
on the difference between natural and accidental forms. By contrast, both
Aquinas and Averroes are interested in exaggerating the difference be-
tween natural substances and artifacts with respect to the relationship
between form and matter in order to make a particular point about the
41. PDA: "Substantiae igitur maxime videntur esse corpora, et horum natu-
ralia, puta terra, ignis, aer, aqua et quaecumque ex his natura operatur; haec enim
sunt aliorum principia; lectus autem et serra et vestis et artificialia accidentis
rationem habent ad ea quae naturae; accidit enim hoc quidem lignis, hoc autem
ferro, hoc autem lanis, et omne corpus artificiale in subiecto naturali consideratur"
(p. 93).
42. PDA p. 101.
43. PDA pp. 101-2.
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relationship between soul and body. Regardless of who Averroes thought
"those opponents" of Aristotle's had been, who supposed soul to be acci-
dental, he was surely aware that many Hellenistic and Arab philosophers,
including Avicenna and Avicebron, had tended to consider the body to be
something substance-like to which the soul was adventitious or superven-
ient.44 Certainly, by the probable date of the De Anima commentary,45
Aquinas was fully aware that he had to cast his own hylomorphism so as not
to conduce to Averroes's conclusion that there is no personal survival of the
dissolution of the soul-body composite in death. Nonetheless, he had com-
pelling reasons of his own for defending some form of vigorous hylomor-
phism. Inter alia Aquinas saw a connection between a correct understanding
of the body-soul relationship and rejection of the incorrect "positio Auice-
bron " that human nature is to be understood as a plurality or hierarchy of
substantial forms.46
Even if the substance-αtm-accident model of artifacts is present coinci-
dentally, so to speak, in discussions of De Anima II. 1, it is worth noting that
the theory is problematic. It is easy to see how the forms of artifacts come
to be thought of as accidental qualifications of pre-existing substances,
particularly in the case of simple objects like iron axes, desks, and beds.
After all, one may say, what is indisputably there in the case of the ax is iron,
which is a substance in its own right. What is an ax over and above the iron
but a particular spatial deployment of the iron which someone has pro-
duced to make a thing suitable for chopping? And so, if we look at the ax
in itself as an object, its form or shape is an accident—though the fitness of
that shape for chopping will not be a matter of accident.
But in this rationale lies a problem: what exactly is the accidental form
that makes the thing the artifact it is? Themistius hedges; the artificial form
is "the shape, the sharpness, and the cutting." As we have seen, Averroes
ends in contradiction by trying to respond to two different philosophical
44. Cf. Herbert A. Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, on Intellect (New
York: Oxford, 1992) for a view of Averroes's Greek and Arab predecessors, and the
succession of positions which he himself maintained.
45. The editors of the Leonine edition place the composition of Aquinas's
Commentary on "De Anima " December, 1267 and September, 1268, Thomas Aquinas,
Opera Omnia XLV,1, intro., p. 283ff.
46. DA ILL The argument seems to be that a substantial form like soul is
understood properly when we understand that it makes the animal to be the kind
of animal it is; and indeed, makes its matter to be actually the matter of that animal.
From which, he says, it follows, "quod impossible est unius rei esse plures formas
substanciales, quia prima faceret ens actu simpliciter et omnes alie advenirent
subiecto iam existenti in actu; unde accidentaliter advenirent: non enim facerent
ens actu simpliciter, set secundum quid." Afortioή, we understand that Auicebron's
"hierarchy of forms" is unacceptable, since it has to be understood as a progressing
sequence of substantial forms informing the same individual (p. 71, 11. 251ff). For
an enlightening account of the problem of the plurality of forms in the Latin
tradition cf. Richard C. Dales, The Problem of the Rational Soul in the Thirteenth Century
(New York: Brill, 1995).
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intuitions. And what exactly is the substance which underlies the accident?
Even if the "substance" of the substance-αm-accident account is obvious for
simple objects like the iron ax and the wooden dish, what about artifacts
whose matter does not pre-exist them, and is in fact made for them, such as
cakes and tupperware cake containers?47 And what is the underlying matter
of artifacts that are extremely complex, like geiger counters or player
pianos?
Moreover, the forms of artifacts do not logically or ontologically fit the
pattern that Aristotelian theory assigns to accidents, which Aquinas summa-
rizes as follows:
This is the difference between the definition of substance and accident
that in the definition of substance nothing is posited which is extήnsic to
the substance of what is defined; for each substance is defined by way
of its material and formal principles; but in the definition of accident
something is posited which is extrinsic to the essence of what is defined,
i.e., the subject; for it is necessary to posit a subject in the definition of
an accident, as when it is said: snubness is curvature of the nose. And
this, then, is because the definition signifies what the thing is; but
substance is something complete in its being and in its form; an accident,
however, does not have complete being, but <being> dependent upon
substance.48
Metaphysically speaking, axes seem to be, like horses, "complete in their
being and form." To this metaphysical objection there may be an answer of
sorts, viz. that there is a dependence in the case of the ax: x's being an ax is
dependent on its being made o/a substance with independent existence, iron,
which can have an ax-shape—there would not be axes, then, if there were
not iron for them to be made of.49
More serious, I think, is the logical problem: unlike 'snubness', which
has to be defined as "a curvature of a nose" 'ax' does not seem to require
the positing of some extrinsic "subject" in its definition—unless we stipulate
that 'ax' =
 d f 'ax-shaped iron'. This definitional strategy is adopted by
47. This argument is advanced by Akrill, "Aristotle's Definitions of Psuche,"
Proceedings of the Aήstotelian Society, new series LXXIII (1972-73), pp. 132-33.
48. DA II. 1: "hec est differencia inter diffinitionem substancie et accidentis
quod in diffinicione substancie nichil ponitur quod sit extra substanciam diffiniti;
diffinitur enim unaqueque substancia per sua principia materialia et formalia; in
diffinitione autem accidentis ponitur aliquid quod est extra essenciam diffiniti,
scilicet subiectum; oportet enim subiectum poni in diffinitione accidentis, sicut
cum dicitur: Simitas est curuitas nasi; et hoc ideo est quia diffinition significat quod
quid est res; substancia autem est quid completum in suo esse et in sua specie;
accidens autem non habet esse completum, set dependens a substancia" (p. 68,
emphasis mine).
49. This is not a very good answer. It can be improved, though not much, by
extending it: There would not be an ax unless there were iron or the equivalent for
it to be made of.
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Aquinas in his commentary on De Interpretation.50 But such definitions may
be circular; and their main virtue is also a defect: they leave out the function
of the artifact, which is its most important feature, and the feature which
determines art essentially as an activity which imitates nature.
V. LANGUAGE AS INSTRUMENTUM/ORGANUM
Some medieval theorists analyze language and linguistic meaning in terms
of the theory of artifacts. In his commentary on De Interpretatione, for
example, Aquinas observes that although the passions of the soul, which
are the primary significates of language, represent things by virtue of a
natural causal process, and although "the vocal sound is a natural thing,"
nonetheless, "Noun and verb have meaning by virtue of human institution,
which is added to the natural thing which serves as its matter, like the
form of a desk to wood."51 Thus here Aquinas treats linguistic meaning
as an accidental form with respect to vocal sound, which is taken as the
natural substance in which it inheres; "we say that a saucer is shaped wood,
and similarly that a name is a meaningful vocal sound."52 We find in Roger
Bacon the related view that the the substantial perfection of an expression
is the modus pronunciandi, whereas meaning is among the accidental per-
fections.53 Similarly, Robert Kilwardby says that the vocal sound is the same
50. Aquinas, Expositio Libή Peήermenias, Opera Omnia I, Lib. 1.4 56-76, (Rome:
Commissio Leonina, 1989). Hereafter cited as CDI. "Set dicendum quod artificialia
sunt quidem in genere substancie ex parte materie, in genere autem accidentum
ex parte forme: nam forme artificialium accidencia sunt; nomen ergo significat
formam accidentalem ut concretam subiecto. Cum autem in diffinitione omnium
accidentium oporteat poni subiectum, necesse est quod, si qua nomina accideήs in
abstracto significat, quod in eorum diffinitione ponatur accidens in recto quasi
genus, et subiectum in obliquo quasi differencia ut cum <dicitur>: "Simitas est
curvitas nasi"; si qua vero nomina accidens significant in concreto, in eorum
diffinitione ponitur materia vel subiectum quasi genus et accidens quasi differencia,
ut cum dicitur: "Simum est nasus curvus". Si igitur nomina rerum artificialium
significant formas accidentales ut concretas subiectis naturalibus, conveniencius est
ut in eorum diffinitione ponatur res naturalis quasi genus, ut dicamus quod scutella
est lignum figuratum, et similiter <quod> nomen est vox significativa," (pp.
20-21).
51. CDI Lib. 1.4. 81-84, p. 10.
52. CDI Lib. 1.4 74-76, pp. 20-21.
53. Roger Bacon, Sumule Dialectices, Opera Hactenus Inedita Rogeή Baconi, fasc.
15-16: Ad quod dicendum quod duplex est perfeccio diccionis, substancialis et
accidencialis, ut patet. Perfeccio enim substancialis hominis est anima, perfectio
accidentalis sunt virtus et sciencia. Similiter in oracionibus et diccionibus; perfeccio
enim substancialis diccionis est modus pronunciandi sive ipsa pronuncia <cio>,
perfeccio autem accidentalis est figuracio sive consignificacio," (pp. 330-31).
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for everyone according to its substance, and is thus natural, but not with
respect to what it signifies, or whether it is Latin or French.54
It is easy enough to see why it is attractive to treat the linguistic item as
an artifact, so that meaning has the status of an accident. After all, a given
configuration of sound (vox) can have several meanings, either because of
equivocation, like 'cants', or because of occurring in differing languages,
like 'chat'.55 But the position is fundamentally problematic because it raises
difficult questions of a sort that are by now familiar. Is it just vocal noise
which is matter, so that the shape imposed by pronunciation must already
be seen as some kind of artificial form—and then what sort of form is
meaning? Or is the written or spoken word the natural substance with
meaning its accidental form? Or is there a hierarchy of forms—and if so,
which of them, if any, is quasi-substantial?
There are new questions as well. Most importantly for the medieval
theorist, if there is to be any legitimate scientific study of language as a
structure of meaning, then linguistic considerations cannot as a whole be
dismissed as a matter of man's arbitrary conferral of accidental forms. It is
part of the overall view which many medieval thinkers share that the works
of nature can be supposed to flow from the creative will of God, thus to be
constituted by necessity, and a fortioή to be proper subject matter for
scientific knowledge. By contrast, to the extent that artifacts fall in the
context of human choice, institution, and purpose, their necessity is hypo-
thetical at best, and they are not scientifically knowable. If there is to be
scientific study of language qua language, then meaningfulness must some-
how be connected with the natural order.
Even if we look aside from these fundamental problems with the
artifact or substance-αm-accident model, we find that De Anima II. 1 fixes a
troublesome latitude of meaning upon 'Όrganum which is a source of
ongoing difficulty for the interpreter of texts about language. Instrumentum
has a similar latitude; it can designate a tool like an ax, but is also used to
designate natural organs of the living organism in most sections of Michael
Scotus's popular translation of Averroes's Great Commentary, and in the
popular Latin translation of Avicenna's De Anima. In many cases, medieval
authors recognize the latitude of Aristotle's terminology and its Latin trans-
lations, and themselves either use the expressions broadly or make it clear
54. Robert Kilwardby, Commentary on De Interpretatione (CDI) (Cambridge
Peterhouse 205): "Ad aliud quod loqui forte est a natura et etiam vox, sed loqui sic
vel sic, scilicet latinis verbis vel gallicis non est a natura. Similiter nee vox significa-
tiva sic vel sic de qua loquitur. Ad tertium iam patet ex dictis, quoniam haec vox
'homo' secundum suam substantiam est eadem omnibus earn proferentibus, tamen
non secundum quod significat animal rationale; non enim omnes significant ani-
mal rationale per hanc vocem 'homo', sed diversi per diversam," (f. 22ra).
55. Even if comparative knowledge of languages is unevenly distributed and
unsteady, theorists are familiar with the examples from Augustine's De Doctήna
Chήstiana II.xxiv.37. Corpus Chήst. XXXI, pars iv.l, (Turnholt: Brepols, 1962).
22 MARY SIRRIDGE
which meaning they intend. Interpretive problems arise, however, when
'instrumentum' and Όrganum' are used in contexts in which it is precisely the
distinction between nature and art which is at issue.
In discussing the primary and secondary perfection of orationes in the
anonymous thirteenth century Sophismata Grammaticalia, the author poses
a question: can a figurative construction like Ovid's "Turba ruunt in me
luxuriosa proci" be imperfect literally (with respect to its surface grammar)
but nonetheless perfect with respect to its secondary perfection (the mean-
ing it conveys)? One argument against this sort of theory of figurative
constructions runs:
Furthermore, the perfection of an organ or instrument is twofold,
primary and secondary, as is obvious from the case of the eye (for here
there is a twofold actuality, i.e., to have sight, and to see); and in the
case of the ax there is simlarly a twofold perfection, first and second
(for its first perfection <consists> of iron and steel, and its secondary
perfection is when it is well and rightly ordered to what it was invented
for, i.e., for cutting, for it is ordered to this end as its final perfection.)
Similarly in the sentence (oratione) there is a twofold perfection, pri-
mary when the suppositive and the appositive <elements> are cor-
rectly ordered, and secondary perfection when it is able to move the
intellect correctly. But when the primary perfection of an instrument
or organ is destroyed, the second is destroyed <as well>, and not the
other way around, as we see in the case of the ax. Thus similarly, since
the sentence is the instrument of the grammarian, when its primary
perfection is destroyed, the secondary <perfection> is destroyed as
well.56
Here the author may be using Όrganum' and 'instrumentum' without any
definite differentiation between the two, and we are not forced to make
a distinction either. An organum, he says, or if you like, an instrumentum,
has a twofold perfection. The conclusion then says that since the oratio
56. Robert Kilwardby (?), Sophismata Grammaticalia, ms. Zwettl f. 135vb: "Ad
idem, duplex est perfectio organi vel instrumenti, scilicet prima et secunda, sicut
patet in oculo (est enim duplex ibi actus, scilicet lucere et videre); et in securi
similiter est duplex perfectio, scilicet prima et secunda (prima eius perfectio est ex
ferro et chalybe, secunda eius perfectio est quando bene et recte ordinatur <ad>
illud <ad> quod instituta est, scilicet ad secandum, quia ordinatur ad hanc finem
sicut ad perfectionem ultimam.) Similiter in oratione duplex est perfectio, scilicet
prima et secunda. Et est prima quando suppositum et appositum ibi sunt recte
ordinata; secunda perfectio est quando recte movere potest intellectum. Sed sic est
quod destructa prima perfectione instrumento vel organo, destruitur secunda, et
non convertitur, sicut patet in securi. Ergo similiter cum oratio sit instrumentum
grammatici, destructa prima perfectione orationis, et destruitur secunda." For a
discussion of this and related arguments, cf. Mary Sirridge, "Robert Kilwardby:
Figurative Constructions and the Limits of Grammar," in De Ortu Grammaticae, ed.
G. L. Bursill-Hall, Sten Ebbesen, and K. Koerner (Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John
Benjamins, 1990).
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has this general ontological structure, if it lacks grammaticality (pήma per-
fectio), it perforce has no cogent meaning (secunda perfectio), just as there
is no ax to do cutting without iron, and no seeing without the power of
vision.57
But when the Ps.-Kilwardby says that the oratio is vox significativa, "non
sicut instrumentum, sed adplacitum,"bS he seems to have in mind some specific
contrast with "ad placitum, " not just the wider application of instrumentum;
and which application he has in mind makes a difference to our reading of
the passage. He probably means to say that meaning is not the substance or
actuality of the vocal sound, but rather a conventional or artificial property
of that substance. But there is a second reading which cannot be excluded.
Ps.-Kilwardby knows the theory of Augustine's De Doctήna Chήstiana well.59
And so his point might be that there is no inherent fit between the sound
vehicle and its meaning, as there is between the ax's shape and its function;
rather the vehicle is established arbitrarily in a situation in which any choice
is better than none whatsoever, given the importance of the institution of
comunication.
And when the Ps.-Kilwardby later says of interjections that "they are
quasi instrumenta by which actions of this sort are performed,"60 it again
does not seem possible to determine what he means by 'instrumentum'.
Is the point that, unlike most aspects of language, which are strictly con-
ventional, the interjection is to be thought of as quasi-natural—as being
like a natural organ such as the eye? (In fact, Ps.-Kilwardby does think
that when someone bursts out with an interjection, a conventionally mean-
ingful expression functions quasi-naturally—somewhat in the way a moan
expresses pain.61) Or is his point that the interjection is to be thought
of along the lines of an ax, as a sort of artificial tool crafted to the purpuse
of expressing emotion? In either case, we have the same conclusion: the
interjection is more intrinsically related to the expression of feeling than
words usually are to their meanings. But we understand his reasoning
differently, depending on which reading of the argument we adopt. In
a similar case, the precise force of Robert Kilwardby's claim in his com-
mentary on De Interpretatione that "veritas est in oratione sicut in organo"
is unclear; possibly the point is that the sentence is a tool by means of
57. I am indebted to Scott MacDonald for this reading of this passage.
58. Ps.-Kildwarby, Commentary on "Pήscian Maior" (Cambridge Peterhouse
191), sect. l,f. 106ra.
59. Cf. Mary Sirridge, "The Wailing of Orphans and the Cooing of Doves: the
Effects of Augustine's De Doctήna Chήstiana on Some Medieval Theories of the
Interjection," in Vestigia, Imagines, Verba. Semiotics and Logic in Medieval Theological
Texts (xi-xiv Century), (Proceedings of the Eleventh European Symposium for Me-
dieval Logic and Semantics.) ed. C. Marmo and R. Lambertini, forthcoming.
60. Ps.-Kildwarby, Commentary on "Pήscian Maior,"f. 108ra.
61. Ps.-Kildwarby, Commentary on "Pήscian Maior": "et sic prorumpit homo in
voce, que re vero illud significat ex instίtutione ad quod significandum homo utitur
quasi naturaliter et sensualitate (ms = naturalitate) dominante" (f. 108vb).
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which truth-saying is effected,62 or just that truth is a relational accident
of a statement. But the context here is logic, and so he might mean
instead that truth is an actuality or perfection of the statement in the
way that the act of seeing is an actuality and perfection of the eye.
Thus in several different ways, De Anima II. 1 exerts a powerful and
confusing influence upon the subsequent tradition. The problem with De
Anima II. 1 is only partly that different translations of the text gave rise to
different interpretations of it. More importantly, Aristotle could write a
passage with a very satisfying rhetorical complexity keyed to the shifting
application of ' organori precisely because he could take the distinction
between artifacts and natural substances more or less for granted; however,
as we see in Aquinas's and Averroes's commentaries and in medieval theo-
ries of language, for philosophers of a later age, the distinction has become
entwined with important items of a changed agenda. The result is that
Aristotle's sophistication becomes a source of considerable confusion.
62. Robert Kildwarby, Commentary on De Interpretatione, "Ad questionem liter-
alem dicendum quod veritas est in anima sicut in efficiente, in re sicut in subiecto,
in oratione sicut in organo; de simile de sanitate, que est in corpore humano sicut
in subiecto, <in> medico sicut in efficiente" (f. 22rb).
